More on Medellin; Breyer's conversion

Opinio Juris is holding an "Insta-Symposium" on the Medellin decision of the United States Supreme Court, now only a few hours old. (The blogosphere is a place full of wonders and marvels.) Volokh and Bench Memos (here, here, and here) weigh in. The holding of the decision is somewhat complicated, but can basically be summarized thus: a judgment by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against the United States, entered under the authority of the Vienna Convention, to which the United States is a signatory, is not in itself binding legal authority in (Texas) state courts.

I defer to the doctrinal analyses by persons more expert in this area than I. (Ed Whelan calls the decision "a significant victory for American citizens and for representative self-government.") However, one addtional observation seem edifying.

In a long and tedious dissent, Justice Breyer argues that the judgment of the ICJ is self-executing because the Supremacy Clause of Article VI says so. The clause says no such thing. Instead, it provides that the US Constitution, federal laws enacted pursuant to the Constitution, and lawful treaties "shall be the supreme law of the land" and that "the judges in every state shall be bound thereby." In his majority opinion, the Chief explains why the Supremacy Clause does not render a judgment by the ICJ self-executing in state courts.

But what strikes the observant reader from Breyer's dissent is his conclusion. "In sum, a strong line of precedent, likely reflecting the views of the Founders, indicates that the treaty provisions before us and the judgment of the International Court of Justice address themselves to the Judicial Branch and consequently are self-executing." (emphasis added) Halleluiah and pass the Scalia bobble-head dolls! Justice Breyer has discovered the virtues of original meaning!

The conservative legal revolution has managed to turn the tide. We're all originalists now.