Courts behaving like courts

Imagine a state high court charged with interpreting a state constitutional amendment that defines marriage as the union of one man and one woman. Imagine the court concluding that, under that provision, marriage is the union of one man and one woman. In other words, imagine a state supreme court interpreting the law, rather than legislating from the bench.

That is precisely what the Michigan Supreme Court did yesterday, when it ruled that a state constitutional amendment, which enshrines conjugal marriage in state law, prohibits state employers from providing marital benefits to same-sex couples. The court demonstrated how elementary is the judicial role. It began its analysis by observing, "The primary objective in interpreting a constitutional provision is to determine the original meaning of the provision to the ratifiers, 'we the people,' at the time of ratification."

Kudos to the high court of Michigan for its exposition of, and faithfulness to, originalism. Is it possible to require Justices Souter, Ginsberg, Breyer, and Stevens to sit under the tutelage of the Michigan Supreme Court for a term or two? The experience would benefit them immensely.